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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
AcT- COVERAGE UNDER 1939 AMENDMENT - In 1956 the Supreme Court handed down two decisions interpreting the 1939
Amendment1 to the Federal Employers' Liability Act2 which substantially extended the act's coverage. The purpose of this short
comment is to examine this extension and its impact on the perennial controversy between advocates of the FELA on the one hand
and workmen's compensation on the other.
In Reed v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,3 the plaintiff, an office clerk
for the defendant railroad, whose duties included filing master
tracings from which blueprints necessary to railroad repairs were
made, was injured when a cracked window pane blew in on her.
In defense to her action under the FELA, as amended in 1939, the
defendant maintained that only transportation employees were
covered by the act. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action.4 On certiorari,
held, reversed, four justices dissenting.5 The 1939 amendment

153 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. (1954) §51. "Any employee of a carrier, any part
of whose duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce
• • • shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this Act. • • ."
2 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. (1954) §51. The act requires the plaintiff to prove
negligence, but abolishes or modifies the railroad's common law defenses.
3 351 U.S. 502 (1956), noted, 36 BOST. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 647 (1956).
4 Reed v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (3d Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 810, noted in 1 Vn.LANOVA
L. R.Ev. 369 (1956).
5 351 U.S. 502 (1956). Frankfurter, J., speaking for the dissenters, argued (at 508)
that Congress intended to cover only employees engaged in "the hazardous business of
railroading."
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did not limit FELA coverage to employees experiencing special
hazards in the railroad industry. Since the tracings were indispensable to the defendant's business, the plaintiff furthered, and her
duties had a close and substantial effect on, interstate transportation.
In a companion case, Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo,6 the Court
held (two justices dissenting7) that an employee injured while
constructing new railroad cars was covered by the act. It rejected
the railroad's contention that the act did not apply because the new
cars had not yet entered interstate commerce, and found that since
a supply of new cars was necessary to the railroad's transportation
needs, the employee's duties furthered and "directly or closely and
substantially" affected interstate commerce within the meaning
of the 1939 amendment.

I
The first Employers' Liability Act8 passed in 1906 was declared
unconstitutional since it covered all employees of interstate carriers,
whether or not their duties related to interstate commerce. 9 The
present act passed in 1908 originally covered only interstate railroad employees engaged in interstate commerce.10 In Shanks v.
Delaware, L. & W.R. Co.,11 decided in 1916, the Court held that
an employee was so engaged only if he was working in interstate
transportation at the moment of his injury. This test did not prove
definitive,12 and led to a flood of litigation13 and many nice distinctions. For example, an employee injured while repairing existing
track was covered, while one constructing new track was not, since
the new track was not yet in interstate commerce.14
351 U.S. 493 (1956).
accurately, " . . . they disagree with the Court's theory in applying the Act
of 1939 . . .," and the rationale of their dissent in the Reed case indicates that they
would probably concur in the result. 351 U.S. 493 at 501 (1956).
s 34 Stat. 232 (1906).
9 The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
10 This act was held valid in the Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
11239 U.S. 556 at 558 (1916). .
12 See Schoene and Watson, "Workmen's Compensation on Interstate Railways," 47
HARv. L. R.Ev. 389 (1934); Carter, "Employment in Interstate Commerce under Federal
Employers' Liability Act," 13 CHI.-K.ENT L. R.Ev. 191 (1935).
13 See Frankfurter and Landis, "The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1931," 46 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 226 at 240 (1932).
14 Compare Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 229 U.S. 146 (1913) with New
York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). See Matter of Baird v. New York
Central R. Co., 299 N.Y. 213, 86 N.E. (2d) 567 (1949), and note 12 supra.
6

7 More
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II
The 1939 amendment was passed to eliminate such restrictive
distinctions by including within the act employees " ... who, while
ordinarily engaged in the transportation of interstate commerce,
may be, at the time of injury, temporarily divorced therefrom and
engaged in interstate operations."15 It has generally been construed
liberally.16 The "moment of injury" test is clearly gone,17 and
the Gileo case properly destroys the "new construction" distinction.18 Significantly, the argument in neither case was pitched on
a constitutional level,19 and it is probable that all employees of
interstate railroads could constitutionally be covered today.20
Despite certain language in subcommittee hearings implying
the contrary,21 it is doubtful that Congress intended to cover all,22
and the Court indicates that coverage will be determined "through
the process of case-by-case adjudication."23 Yet the test the Court
suggests, i.e., " ... whether what he [the employee] does in any
way furthers or substantially affects transportation," 24 is sufficiently elastic to include all employees, and lower courts may have difficulty in determining who was meant to be excluded. As in the
15 S. Rep. 661, 76th Cong., 1st sess., p.
16 See cases collected in 10 A.L.R. (2d)

2 (1939).
1279 at 1286 (1950), and an excellent analysis
of the pre-1947 cases in Delisi, "Scope of the Federal Employers' Liability Act-Recent
Developments," 18 Mrss. L. J. 206 (1947). But see Lawrence v. Rutland Railroad Co., 112
Vt. 523, 28 A. (2d) 488 (1942), cert. den. 317 U.S. 693 (1943), and Moser v. Union Pacific
R. Co., 65 Idaho 479 at 489, 147 P. (2d) 336 (1944).
17 Southern Pac. Co. v. Gileo, 351 U.S. 493 at 498 (1956). Since 1939 only Illinois
has kept the test, but in changed form. See Thomson v. Industrial Commission, 380 Ill.
386 at 393, 44 N.E. (2d) 19 (1942), cert. den. 318 U.S. 755 (1943). " ... [T]he test must
be whether the activity in which the employee is engaged at the time of the accident,
directly or closely and substantially affects interstate commerce."
18 Only one case since 1939, Moser v. Union Pacific R. Co., note 16 supra, has been
found holding that a new construction worker was not covered.
19 Reed v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 351 U.S. 502 at 505 (1956).
20 See Virginia Ry. v. Federation, 300 U.S. 515 at 557 (1937); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
21 S. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1708,
76th Cong., 1st sess., p. 58, where Senator Austin states, "I think I will move to substitute
for those words ["or in any way"] the words that occur and recur in many cases of
recent date as defining what kind of effect on interstate [commerce] is comprehended by
the commerce clause of the Constitution. Those are the words 'directly, closely and substantially.'" While this language may indicate an intent to cover all employees, in context it more likely indicates only complete coverage of transportation employees, though
not actually in interstate commerce at the moment of injury.
22 See S. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary on S. 1708,
76th Cong., 1st sess., p. 29 (1939), where F. M. Rivinus, General Counsel, Norfolk &
Western R. Co. states, "Argument may even be made that the present amendments mean
to include all employees of interstate carriers by railroads. . . • If that is what these
amendments mean they would be honest to say so. . . .'' Congress did not so say.
23 Reed v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 351 U.S. 502 at 507 (1956).
24 Id. at 505.
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Shanks case, the Court continued to require that the employee's
duties further interstate transportation rather than interstate commerce. Yet it made this distinction meaningless by stating, "If 'any
part' of petitioner's duties is in 'furtherance' of ... interstate commerce, it also is in 'furtherance' of ... interstate transportation." 2 is
"Transportation" as used in the Senate committee report probably
indicates an intent to limit coverage to those injured around tracks,
yards, depots, repair shops, etc., i.e., those places normally associated with the actual movement of goods where danger of injury
is comparatively great. 26 At least three of the four cases cited by the
Court in support of the Reed holding can be distinguished on that
ground. 27 A witness b_efore the subcommittee hearings supposed
the amendment to be so limited,28 but the Court held the language
of the amendment to be broader than required to remedy the specific ills toward which it was directed.29 Yet, as Justice Frankfurter
observed, Congress would have no more reason for covering railroad office clerks than clerks in any other major industry dealing
in interstate commerce.80 The only other case found which dealt
with office clerks suing under the FELA held that a typist in the
railroad's claims department was not covered.81 This dearth of
authority probably indicates that the legal profession felt such clerical employees were not entitled to the act's benefits and advised
against an action under the FELA, but may indicate that such office
employees are seldom injured seriously enough to warrant suit.
25 Ibid.
26 See S.

Rep. 661, 76th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3 (1939). "Railroad men are frequently
injured while moving or working upon cars or engines which have been temporarily
withdrawn from interstate commerce and which were, just before or just after the injury,
used in such commerce. • . • The adoption of the proposed amendment will, to a very
large extent, eliminate the necessity of determining whether an employee, at the very
instant of his injury or death, was actually engaged in the movement of interstate traffic."
(Emphasis added.) The general import of such language does not suggest clerks in
office buildings.
27 Ericksen v. Southern Pac. Co., 39 Cal. (2d) 374, 246 P. (2d) 642 (1952) (lumber
inspector injured on loading dock); Straub v. Reading Co., (3d Cir. 1955) 220 F. (2d)
177 (assistant chief timekeeper injured in storeroom in terminal and characterized, at 183,
as "a borderline case"); Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947) (woman telegrapher
assaulted at night in small frame building in isolated part of railroad yard. Coverage
question not discussed). In Bowers v. Wabash R. Co., (Mo. App. 1952) 246 S.W. (2d)
535, a messenger boy killed en route from one railroad station to another was held covered
so that the state compensation act did not apply.
28 S. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1708,
76th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8, where T. J. McGrath, General Counsel, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen states, "Its application will be confined, of course, to the character of
employees now covered by the present act."
20 Reed v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 351 U.S. 502 at 506 (1956).
80 Id. at 512.
81 Holl v. Southern Pac. Co., (S.D. Cal. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 21.
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If the latter is true, the "mess" of litigation envisaged by Frankfurter as a result of the Reed decision may not occur.32 In any case,
on its particular facts, this decision may be in harmony with the
spirit of the test enunciated in the Reed case.33

III
Justice Frankfurter has consistently advocated a federal workmen's compensation act for railroad employees34 and has vigorously
attacked the fault basis upon which the FELA rests as "archaic and
unjust," 35 "cruel and wasteful," 36 and "antiquated and uncivilized."37 Since the Court has held that the FELA pre-empts the
field, 38 the expanded coverage of the principal cases will further
cut down the scope of the state compensation acts and will presumably increase the number of injured railroad employees who will
recover nothing because they cannot prove negligence. The assumption that negligence under the FELA is more difficult to
prove than the elements of a workmen's compensation case may
not be justified in the light of recent studies,39 however, and at
32 However, the uncertainty left by the Reed holding will almost reqqire litigation
of the coverage question in every suit brought by a clerk, whether under the FELA or
a state compensation act. Coverage must be shown to exist under the federal act and,
since the FELA pre-empts the field (see note 38 infra), FELA coverage must be shown
not to exist when bringing an action under a state act.
33 Both courts approached the problem in the same manner. The Supreme Court
found that operations could not long continue without the repairs which required
blueprints made from plaintiff's tracings. The district court found no impact on the
movement of goods in either typing or failing to type claims. Query: Suppose the clerk
had typed bills of lading, or had been the railroad president's secretary?
34 See Frankfurter and Landis, "The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1931," 46 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 226 at 249 (1932). See also Frankfurter's dissent in Ferguson v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521 at 539 (1957).
35 Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54 at 71 (1943).
36Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 at 65 (1949).
37 Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 at 196 (1949).
38New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917). It has been argued
that the added area of coverage of the 1939 amendment is concurrent with state compensation acts. Miller, "An Interpretation of the Act of 1939 (FELA) To Save Some Remedies
for Compensation Claimants," 18 LAW AND CONTE!\!. PROB. 241 (1953). This construction
seems doubtful and would retain all the coverage problems the 1939 amendment was
designed to eliminate.
39 RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, "\VORK INJURIES IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY, 1938-40
(1947), Vol. II, table C-1~, which indicates that of 87 permanent total disability cases studied
which were dealt with under the FELA, in only one was there no compensation, and in
only six was remuneration under $2,500. Table C-16 indicates that of 404 fatal injury
cases studied which were handled under the FELA, the survivors in only 18, less than
4]/2%, received under $5()_0. Furtller, the study was made before the 1939 amendment could
have much impact, and when tort recoveries were considerably under what they would
be today. One study [CONARD AND MEHR, Cos-rs OF ADMINISTERING REPARATION FOR WoRK
INJURIES IN ILLINOIS (1952)] summarized in Conard, "Is Workman's Compensation More
Efficient than Employer's Liability," 38 A.B.A.J. l0ll (1952), concluded that of the total
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least one railroad labor union40 prefers the present tort recoveries
to a federal workmen's compensation plan.41 This is understandable in view of the background of low state compensation schedules,42 the present tendency of the Supreme Court to leave the
question of negligence to the jury,43 and the generally accepted
tendency of juries to find a railroad negligent. The railroads have
urged that this amounts to liability without fault, without, however, the controlled awards present in workmen's compensation
laws, and thus they have favored a federal compensation act.44

Robert ]. Hoerner
amount spent in the compensation of injured workmen, a larger percentage winds up in
the worker's pocket under FELA than under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act.
See also Richter and Forer, "Federal Employers' Liability Act-A Real Compensatory
Law for Railroad Workers,'' 36 CORN. L. Q. 203 (1951), and Forer and Richter, "An
Analysis of the Federal Employers' Liability Act and Proposed Amendments Thereto,''
28 TEMP. L. Q. 363 at 390, footnote 126 (1955), where the authors indicate that in their
experience 96% of injured workmen recover as much or more under FELA as they would
have under existing state compensation plans.

40 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.
41 SOMERS AND SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

320 (1954), observes that " .•. the
attitude of the BRT now appears more representative of the real views of railway labor."
See notes 42 and 43 infra. But see Miller, "The Quest for a Federal Workmen's Compensation Law for Railroad Employees," 18 LAw AND CONTEM. PROB. 188 (1953). A number
of federal compensation acts have been proposed, see Appendix in Pollack, "Workmen's
Compensation for Railroad Work Injuries and Diseases," 36 CORN. L. Q. 236 at 271 and
272 (1951), and one labor leader has suggested that only opposition by some segments
of railway labor has prevented their passage. Harrison, "Railway Labor Favors Federal
Accident Compensation Law," 24 AM. LAB. LEG. REv. 161 (1934).
42 SOMERS AND SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 38 et seq. (1954); Katz and Wirpel,
"Workmen's Compensation 1910-1952: Are Present Benefits Adequate," 4 LAB. L. J. 167
(1953); Cheit, "Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation," 1955 INS. L. J. 245.
43 See Alderman, "What the New Supreme Court Has Done to the Old Law of
Negligence,'' 18 LAW AND CONTEM. PROB. 110 (1953). While purporting to follow the
usual common law concept of negligence, 336 U.S. 53 at 61-62 (1949), the Court in recent
years has almost always found that a directed verdict for a railroad was improper. See
the excellent treatment in 69 HARV. L. REv. 1441 at 1447 (1956), and see, e.g., Webb v.
Illinois Central R. Co., 352 U.S. 512 (1957).
44 See S. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S.
1708, 76th Cong., 1st sess., p. 24 (1939).

